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13. Before passing on to the larger question of Shanghai, we wish to point out that in cases where evacuation of minor concession ports is necessary, the Navy will undertake the arrangements.
Events at Hankow and Kiukiang have shown how difficult it is to decide the moment when mere mob violence is likely to develop into an attack by the military forces of the Chinese Nationalist Government. The presence of military forces and the use of firearms for the maintenance of order may precipitate a serious conflict. In these circumstances, we think that the moment of evacuation, or of preparation for evacuation, must be left to the men on the spot.
SHANGHAI
14. The most difficult part of the problem which confronts us at this moment is the protection of our interests at Shanghai. If this cannot be arranged by diplomatic methods. it may be necessary to resort to force. Our Secretary informs us that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has expressed the wish that we should approach this subject on the assumption that Shanghai is to be held in all circumstances. In view of the vastness of the British and international interests at stake we agree that this is the only point of view from which the subject can be approached.
15. Although no definite information is available, we estimate that Shanghai is liable to attack by Nationalist armies up to a strength of 80,000 men, with artillery and aeroplanes. The precise fighting value to be placed on these forces is difficult to determine. but is certainly not high. These forces, according to local reports, might reach Shanghai any time after the 22nd January.
The only existing forces at Shanghai are the Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteers, believed to number over 2.000, but arrangements have been made to despatch the Indian Battalion from Hong Kong if required. and it is understood that arrange- ments are being made with the other Treaty Powers to bring the total reinforcements up to 4,000 men. No further British reserves are available nearer than India. whence troops could not arrive within less than six to eight weeks from the date of the order. When the whole of this reinforcement of 4,000 men has been assembled, we cannot regard the total force available as more than sufficient, in the first instance, for the purpose of maintaining order amid a possibly hostile population of over 1,000,000. For guarding the large perimeter of Shanghai against attack by the Chinese Nationalist Army, considerably larger forces would be required, which we estimate as at least one Division and a Squadron of aircraft over and above the force required for the maintenance of order.
16. We wish to emphasize that it is impossible for Great Britain to under- take the defence of the Settlement single-handed. As the dates we have given show, it is impracticable to transport sufficient British reinforcements before the possible date of arrival of the Chinese Nationalist Army. Even if it were possible we should greatly deprecate isolated action except as the very last resort, as it would inevitably involve us in a war in which, in all probability, the whole of China would be united against us, with disastrous results to our vast interests throughout the East.
17. In these circumstances we attach the first importance to the organisation of international action. Moreover, such action must be prompt if Shanghai is to be saved by military means. As mentioned in our Report of June 1925 (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B), there is only one nation which can send large forces to China at short notice, and that is Japan. Whether Japan's appreciation of the importance of international solidarity in China is sufficiently strong to induce her to undertake the principal share in the defence of Shanghai, where British interests predominate, is a matter on which we offer no opinion. If, however, an appeal is made to Japan, we recommend that the British Government should simultaneously offer to send its share of the international contingent, even though it cannot arrive until a later stage. We think also that the French and the United States Governments should also send their quotas, and, so far as we are able to judge from recent telegrams, they are not unfavourably disposed in this matter.
18. On the basis of a total force of one division, the British and American quotas should each amount to a mixed brigade, and the Japanese, owing to their
5
proximity to the scene of action. might be asked to send two brigades. It is of great importance that the Japanese contingent should be despatched at the earliest possible
moment.
19. We attach great importance to the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the international force, and if, as we recommend, Japan is to be the predominant. partner, the command should be vested in a Japanese Officer.
20. Up to now we have been treating the matter from a purely military point of view vis-à-vis the Nationalist Army. We cannot, however, ignore some political considerations which weigh heavily upon the military position. To judge exactly what the reaction of the arrival of large military forces at Shanghai will be upon the situation in China, is beyond our province. We understand, however, that up to now the advance of the Chinese. Nationalist forces has been accompanied by an accession to their strength. They may even be joined by Sun's army, estimated at 60,000 men, which is now ostensibly defending Shanghai against the Nationalists. Some portions of this army are reported already to have deserted to their enemy. Further, we are not in a position to judge whether or to what extent the resistance of Shanghai may be accompanied by a spontaneous outbreak of anti-foreign movements in other parts of China and by organised action for the recovery of the Concession at Tientsin similar to that taken on the Yangtse. We have no doubt that a purely British resistance at Shanghai would produce the most serious conse- quences to British interests in China. Possibly, however, the Nationalist Govern- ment may pause before taking such action as would unite a large part of the world against them.
21.
Another danger which, perhaps, cannot altogether be excluded is that the Chinese Nationalists, on approaching Shanghai, may try to follow the same course, mutatis mutandis, which they adopted at Hankow. There is, however, at Shanghai no separate British Concession like that at Hankow, and British interests. being dispersed throughout the International Settlement, cannot be isolated and marked out for special treatment as distinct from those of the other Powers. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Chinese Nationalists might make the British defending forces their main objective. We are informed, however, that at Shanghai in the past, while the French have confined their activities to the safeguarding of their own interests, the Japanese and Americans have co-operated with us in taking joint action.
A third risk is that, in the event of a serious resistance being offered by the Powers at Shanghai, the Chinese Nationalist Government might turn their attention towards Canton and Hong Kong.
22.
We recognise that the magnitude of our interests at Shanghai and the reaction of a disaster there on our interests and prestige in other parts of China and of the whole East may be such as to compel us to an active defence. We admit the possibility also that by showing a bold front at Shanghai we may stop the rot. But we feel bound to point out that our attitude may lead to a war, the consequences and magnitude of which cannot be foreseen. From our point of view, the only advantage to be gained from such a war is the upholding of our Treaty rights, the retention of what we already hold and the maintenance of our prestige in the East. Japan, however, may have more to gain, and it is on Japan that we should have to rely to carry the main burden.
23.
SUGGESTED MILITARY RESERVE IN THE FAR EAST.
All these considerations lead us to repeat and emphasize the desirability urged in our Report of June 1925 (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B), in favour of permanent increase in our military forces in the Far East so that a small reserve may be available to meet emergencies. The arrangement whereby a large propor- tion of the Infantry garrison of Singapore is to be transported from India on or just before the outbreak of hostilities, contravenes a principle rigidly adhered to before the War whereby the garrisons of defended ports abroad were maintained in time of peace at war strength. By an increase in the number of troops stationed at Singapore we should at one and the same time increase the security of the Naval Base and provide a small reserve available for emergencies in the Far East such as the present.
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